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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-VALIDITY OF CONTRACT PROVISIONS FOR SUM-
MARY EXPULSION.
Defendant, a privately maintained university, in accordance with a power
reserved to it by the contract of registration, discharged the plaintiff student
without assigning any reason for the dismissal. Plaintiff sued, claiming that
the action of the university was unjust. Held, that a provision reserving to
the university the right to dismiss a student at any time without assigning a
cause was valid; that although the university need not give a reason for
discharging the student it must nevertheless have a reason; and that the
university could only reserve to itself the right of arbitrary dismissal in
order to carry out certain purposes, as the protection of standards of
scholarship or moral conduct. Anthony v. Syracuse University (1928), 224
App. Div. 487, 231 N. Y. S. 435.
The earlier cases upon the subject hold that in the absence of express
provisions a university has no right to dismiss a student without prefering
charges against him and providing some sort of hearing and that if this
course is not followed the student may have a writ of mandamus for rein-
statement. These cases, however, expressly limit their language so that it
does not apply to situations in which the right of arbitrary dismissal has
been expressly reserved. Commonwealth v. McCawley (1886), 3 Pa. Col.
Ct. 77; Baltimore University v. Colton (1904), 98 Md. 623, 57 A. 14.
These cases apparently have been overruled by decisions holding that
even in the absence of an express provision to that effect, a college may dis-
charge a student for violation of rules without a trial or preferring charges
against him. Goldstein v. N. Y. U. (1902), 78 N. Y. S. 739; J. B. Stetson
University v. Hunt (1924), 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637. Where the right to
dismiss arbitrarily has been expressly reserved by a private educational in-
stitution, the validity of the provision has never been denied by any court
and is affirmed in Barker v. Trustees of Byrn Mawr (1923), 278 Pa. 121,
122 A. 220. By registration the student agrees to obey all reasonable regu-
lations of the university as to discipline and scholarship and the courts will
not interfere with the university's enforcement of the rules unless they are
contrary to public policy. Gott v. Berea College (1913), 156 Ky. 376, 161
S. W. 204; Woods v. Simpson (1924), 146 Md. 547, 126 A. 882; Pratt v.
Wheaton (1866), 40 Ill. 186.
But the power of a university to make regulations and enforce discipline
is examined more critically in the case of a school supported entirely or in
part by the state. Gleason v. U. of Minn. (1908), 104 Minn. 359, 116 N. W.
650, and dictum in Anthony v. Syracuse U. (1928), 224 App. Div. 231 N.
Y. S. 435. Nevertheless a state institution may make and enforce by ex-
pulsion such regulations as are reasonable and necessary for carrying out
the purposes for which the university was organized. Tanton v. McKenney
(1924), 226 Mich. 245, 197 N. W. 510; Connell v. Gray (1912), 33 Okla. 417,
127 P. 417.
Actions of the student not ordinarily within the control of the university
have been held to justify expulsion if they bring discredit upon the univer-
sity, as in Samson v. Trustees of Columbia U. (1917), 10 Misc. 146, 167
N. Y. S. 202, where it was held that a university was justified in expelling a
student for an unpatriotic speech which was not made during the school
term. Anti-fraternity rules and rules against smoking in women's colleges
and men's preparatory schools have been held to be reasonable regulations
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justifying expulsion for their violation. Pratt v. Wheaton (1866), 40 Ill.
186; Tanton v. McKenney (1924), 226 Mich. 245, 197 N. W. 510.
C. S., '30.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-TRANSFER TAX-INCLUSION OF IN-
SURANCE IN GROSS ESTATE.-The executor of the estate of a decedent sued
in the Court of Claims for a refund of taxes paid on the proceeds of insur-
ance policies in which the insured reserved the right to change the bene-
ficiaries. By the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 227), these were included
in the gross estate of the decedent. The petition attacked the validity of
such tax, claiming first, that the tax was direct, and hence void because not
apportioned; and second, that such inclusion in the gross estate effected an
increase of tax upon the beneficiaries and those who shared in the remain-
ing estate so as to constitute a deprivation of property without due process
of law. On certificate to the United States Supreme Court, held, first, that
this is a tax on the transfer of the property and, therefore, not subject to
the constitutional provision requiring apportionment of direct taxes; and,
second, that such inclusion does not constitute a violation of the due process
clause. Chase National Bank v. United States (1928), 49 S. Ct. 126, 73 L.
Ed. (adv.) 114.
A life insurance policy reserving to the insured the right to change the
beneficiary does not vest an interest in the named beneficiary, because the
insured maintains as complete control of the policy as if he himself were the
beneficiary. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Swett (1915), 222 F. 200,
137 C. C. A. 640, Ann. Cas. 1917B 298; Re Joseph Greenberg (1921), 271 F.
258, 20 A. L. 1 . 253. See also Cooley's BRIEFS ON INSURANCE, Vol. VII, p.
6406. Some few cases hold that such a beneficiary's interest is vested, sub-
ject to being divested. Roquemore v. Dent (1902), 135 Ala. 292 So., 33 So.
178 and Ellison v. Straw (1903), 116 Wis. 207 N. W. 92 N. W. 1094 under
the Wisconsin statute. But the better and the majority rule does not treat
such an interest as analogous to the real property rule of vested rights;
rather the interest is treated as contingent. Fuller v. Linzee (1883), 135
Mass. 468.
It is true that so much of the Revenue Act of 1919 (40 Stat. 1057), as re-
quires all conveyances of property taking effect in possession and enjoy-
ment only after the transferor's death to be included in the gross estate of
the decedent transferor for purposes of taxation, violates the constitutional
provision against taking property without due process of law. Nichols v.
Coolidge (1926), 274 U. S. 531, 52 A. L. R. 1181; Untermeyer v. Anderson
(1927), 276 U. S. 440. But where a trust had been created before the pas-
sage of the statute, reserving to the settlor the power to dispose of the re-
mainder, a tax might be levied under the act on the power or succession,
because the death of the settlor freed the remainder, or terminated the
power, and this prerequisite to complete succession did not occur until after
the enactment of the statute. So long as the privilege of succession has not
been completely exercised, it may be taxed. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall (1927),
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